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ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: THE DANGERS
OF AN UNREGULATED MARKET AND THE NEED FOR
REFORM
Andrea Preisler*
I. INTRODUCTION
The last century has seen incredible advances in science never before
imaginable. Identifying health concerns and curing diseases have given
people new hope in science and its abilities. However, while these
scientific and technological advances bring great joy and relief, they also
prompt controversial debates. One such debate has surrounded assisted
reproductive technology ("ART"). Ethical, social, and legal challenges
surrounding this technology have plagued the United States. For many
couples and women desperate to have a child, ART is seen as a magical
cure to infertility. Others denounce it as a "new holy war against human
nature."' To them, it is morally repugnant to let science and technology
intervene in the most sacred area of human life: procreation.
As society struggles to assess the ethical, cultural, legal, and religious
dimensions of what this reproductive technological progress means for
families and society, scientists continue to improve upon and advance
ART. 2 Because of society's struggle to come up with a cohesive
consensus on ART, lawmakers have been slow to address this technology.
This apprehension has left a gaping hole for a booming, unregulated
market fraught with fraud and abuse. There are no rules and restrictions
for ART providers or the intermediaries who have identified a wildly
lucrative niche in the market; it is a lawless free-for-all where the most
exploitive providers reign. Currently, ART cannot be explored solely
through a legal framework simply because no such structure exists;
instead, it first must be analyzed through an economic lens. One cannot
formulate a comprehensive legal structure for the ART industry without
understanding and accepting the economic realities of this science turned
big business. "Buyers, sellers, supply and demand, and technological
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2014. B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2011.
She serves as the incoming Executive Text and Peer Review Editor on DePaul's Journal of Health Care
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1. Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, 120 HARV. L. REv. 574 (2006).
2. Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35 (2000).
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advances all operate in a robust marketplace . . . with minimum state and
federal regulatory control."' This lack of oversight has opened the
floodgates to exploitation and commercialization of one of the most valued
and personal aspects of society.4 Third parties have been quick to
recognize that there is no profit ceiling given the lack of federal regulation
and ineffective and unenforceable industry recommendations.
The absence of oversight and regulation combined with the high cost
of fertility treatments created the perfect storm for the commercialization
of procreation. While assisted reproductive technology has given infertile
couples and individuals hope for a child, state legislatures and Congress
have fundamentally failed to respond to this technology by promulgating
shallow regulations that are nonbinding, unenforced, and inadequately
funded thereby exposing consumers of the technology to safety hazards
and financial exploitation. Technology that emerges as controversial and
becomes so deeply rooted in society becomes difficult, if not impossible,
to regulate.' The regulatory history of reproductive technology, or lack
thereof, "highlights the phenomenon that strong public acceptance and
entrenched market forces surrounding new technologies often result in
suboptimal safety standards." 6
In order to explore the legal implications of assisted reproductive
technology, one must understand what it is. This article begins with a
background in ART in Part II. Part III provides an overview of the history
of regulation and its current state while outlining inadequacies. Part IV
addresses concerns and possibilities for fraud and abuse in the
reproductive technology industry, including abuses as they relate to
providers of assisted reproductive technology and middlemen. Finally,
Part V explores what is needed in a successful and effective regulatory
framework, its aims, and how to implement new regulation.
II. WHAT IS ART?
Assisted reproductive technology ("ART") is the general terminology
used to define the process of conceiving a child through artificial or
partially artificial means. It is typically viewed as a means of treating
infertility. The Centers of Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), as a
3. Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing the Market for Human Reproductive Tissue Alienability: Why Can We
Sell Our Eggs But Not Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 643 (2008).
4. Meena Lal, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 13 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 517, 518 (1997).
5. Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, supra note 1, at 592.
6. Id. at 595.
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result of the 1992 Fertility Clinic and Success Rate and Certification Act,
defines ART as "all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are
handled. In general, ART procedures involve surgically removing eggs
from a woman's ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory,
and returning them to the woman's body or donating them to another
woman."' The acceptance and use of ART has been increasing rapidly
from its inception in the 1970s.' ART has spawned an industry that aids
thousands of American couples and women with conceiving children
despite the high out-of-pocket costs.9
ART encompasses several distinct methods of achieving pregnancy,
and some methods may be combined and modified. Procedures of ART
include artificial insemination, pre-implantation surgeries, surrogacy, and
in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). This article primarily addresses IVF and the
sperm bank intermediary in IVF and artificial insemination.
In vitro fertilization, the classic form of ART, was first accomplished
in 1978 and the first American IVF birth took place in 1981.10 Since its
inception, IVF has resulted in over two million births worldwide." IVF is
typically used after other infertility treatment options have been exhausted.
It is accomplished by harvesting eggs from a female and mixing them with
sperm from a male in a petri dish where fertilization occurs. One or more
of the resulting embryos are then transferred back into the patient where
they implant themselves in the uterine wall. 2 There are various methods
of IVF given its use of gametes: the sperm and/or eggs may come from
donors, the fertilized embryos may be transferred back into the woman
who supplied the eggs or into an unrelated surrogate, and the embryos may
be transferred into the woman's uterus or, usually at an earlier period of
embryonic development, into her fallopian tubes. 3 The process of placing
the embryo into the uterus or fallopian tube is accomplished using a tube
called a cannula, just as sperm is in artificial insemination. 4
7. 42 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2012).
8. John A. Robertson, Commerce and Regulation in the Assisted Reproduction Industry, 85 TEX. L. REV.
665 (2007).
9. Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology,
I Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 227 (2001).
10. Robertson, supra note 8 at 665.
11. Id.
12. Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation,
55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 609 (2003).
13. Id.
14. Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the Science of Artificial Re-
productive Technology and the Laws Which Govern That Technology, 48 DEPAUL. L. REV. 825, 834
(1999).
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Artificial insemination is the placement of semen into the uterus
opening." The sperm cells travel through the cervix and uterus and into
the fallopian tube where they fertilize one or more eggs. The fertilized
egg, which is now a zygote, moves back down the fallopian and into the
uterus where it implants itself into the uterine wall.16 Artificial
insemination is a particularly attractive ART option for a female who does
not have a male partner or has a male partner who is sterile.
III. HISTORY OF ART POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT
INVOLVEMENT
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter appointed an Ethics Advisory Board
("EAB") to address research issues surrounding ART, specifically those
relating to IVF, which experienced its first success a year earlier. 7
Ultimately, the EAB issued a report stating it was "acceptable from an
ethical standpoint to undertake and fund research involving human IVF
and embryo transfer subject to various qualifications."" While the EAB
approved of continued research of IVF, it avoided the relevant ethical and
legal questions regarding the morality of IVF or embryo research and how
IVF technology and research fit into the United States legal regime.
Despite the EAB's support for continued research of IVF, it intentionally
circumvented the difficult issues that ART raised and continues to raise.
Subsequently, the Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush administrations
denied funding for the EAB.19 Without federal funding and minimal
authority, the EAB disappeared.
Lacking federal oversight or funding, ART research was privately
funded in the 1980s. Private firms quickly discovered the earning
potential of ART and began to dominate this area of science operating
under a set of suggested guidelines with minimal oversight.2 0 This allowed
private researchers to push the limits of ART. The private industry's rapid
advances coupled with the lack of regulation fueled the demand for this
miracle technology. These circumstances exemplified the "ever-
increasing gap between ART and the field of medical science, on the one
15. Michael J. Kirby, Medical Technology and new Frontiers ofFamily Law, 14 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
113(1986).
16. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 14, at 834.
17. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 654.
18. Id.
19. Id
20. Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, supra note 1, at 574.
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hand, and the lack of any consistent regulation of that science, on the
other."21
IV. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Currently, the private sector continues to dominate ART research.
Private firms, companies, and university medical facilities conduct ART
research and operate by their own non-binding standards and guidelines
outlined by several medical societies and associations.22 From the outset
of the private sector developing ART technology, the government was
apprehensive to get involved and formulate a cohesive legal framework of
rules and regulations.23 This initial apprehension of how to approach ART
had the unfortunate and likely unintended consequence of opening up a
burgeoning private assisted reproductive technology industry. The United
States' only policy on reproductive technologies is essentially a market-
driven policy.24
A. 1992 Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act
The oversight and policy of ART has largely been a story of self-
regulation with little effort by state or federal government to formulate an
enforceable policy. Legally, the right to oversee the reproductive
technology industry has been assigned to the Department of Health and
Human Services ("DHHS").25 In 1992 the DHHS delegated this oversight
power to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") in the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act ("FCSRCA"), which
outlines critical components of ART regulation.26 The Act promulgates a
model program for the certification of embryo laboratories, which was to
be adopted and carried out voluntarily by individual states.27
The enactment of FCSRCA was largely driven by public policy
concerns and the need to assure high standards of care within the assisted
reproductive technology market. 28 The Act stated, "not later than 2 years
21. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 14, at 828.
22. Hecht, supra note 9, at 253.
23. Id. at 231.
24. Andrews & Elster, supra note 2, at 36.
25. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 14, at 843.
26. Yaniv Heled, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue-The Need for Fed-
eral Regulation, 11 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REv. 243, 250 (2010).
27. Implementation of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992-A Model Program
for the Certification of Embryo Laboratories, 64, Fed. Reg., 39374 (21 July 1999).
28. Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Marking the Fine Line: Ethics and the Regulation of Innovative Technologies in
Human Reproduction, 11 MINN. J. L. SC. & TECH. 685, 701 (2010).
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after October 24, 1992, the Secretary, through the Centers for Disease
Control, shall develop a model program for the certification of embryo
laboratories (referred to in this section as a "certification program") to be
carried out by the States."29
Section two of the FCSRCA required ART clinics and providers to
report their pregnancy success rates to the CDC and all reporting standards
were to be established by the CDC." The statute required that the
Secretary, through the CDC, define pregnancy success rates and mandate
that each clinic report its success rates annually so that the CDC can make
the findings publically available.3 1 This policy was intended to combat the
problem of clinics exaggerating pregnancy success rates and to ensure that
consumers are properly informed and knowledgeable about pregnancy
success rates. Further, the policy would allow consumers to more
accurately predict the chances of a live birth.32
Section three of the FCSRCA required the CDC to develop a model
program for the accreditation of IVF laboratories that was to be adopted by
each state.33 Again, the Secretary, through the CDC, was to "promulgate
criteria and procedures for the approval of accreditation organizations to
inspect and certify embryo laboratories."34 The Act briefly stated that
certified laboratories were to meet certain criteria and procedures "as the
Secretary . . . may require"" and that the performance of each accredited
organization must be evaluated and inspected annually by such means "as
the Secretary determines to be appropriate."3 6 In 1999, the CDC published
the Model Program, which set forth a skeleton of a certification program
for individual states to adopt, supplement, and implement. The Program
included proposed definitions, administrative requirements, and laboratory
standards.37
Additionally, the Act instructed the Secretary of DHHS to annually
publish pregnancy success rates as reported by ART programs." It also
instructed the Secretary to compile a list of noncompliant laboratories.
However, the Act does not promulgate a means to shut down these
noncompliant organizations, allowing them to continue to operate without
29. 42 U.S.C. § 263 a-2(a)(1) (2012).
30. Heled, supra note 26, at 250.
31. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 14, at 843.
32. Id.
33. Hecht, supra note 9, at 255.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-3(a) (2012).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-3(b)(1) (2012).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-3(c)(2) (2012).
37. Heled, supra note 26, at 250.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-5(1)(A) (2012).
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meeting standards and consequently without sanctions." Without teeth,
the noncompliance list is virtually meaningless.
Theoretically, these provisions would maximize the quality of IVF
procedures and ensure compliance with safety guidelines. They are
neither difficult to comply with nor hinder clinic productivity. However,
nearly all CDC efforts have been ineffective because of a lack of federal
funding.40 The 1992 FCSRCA did not receive federal funding for
implementation until 1996 when the HHS allocated a meager $1 million
dollars to the CDC.4 1
The FCSRCA does not mandate states implement the certification
program, aggravating its effectiveness.42  Therefore, Congress'
establishment of a voluntary certification for embryo laboratories "fails to
fulfill the existing need for clinics' standardization and internal control."4 3
The director of the CDC claims 90% of clinics voluntarily report their
success rates; however, without any audit mechanism or funding to devote
to auditing, there is no way to confirm the accuracy of the reported data.44
Further, because accreditation is voluntary, there is no system of
determining exactly how many ART clinics currently offer laboratory
services therefore making the director of CDC's claim unprovable.
On its face, the FCSRCA appears to be an appropriate regulatory
measure because it provides guidelines and standards to assure consistent
performance of procedures, quality control, and standard recordkeeping.
However, there is neither inherent power to establish any regulation that
has the effect of exercising supervision over the practice of ART programs
nor any enforcement mechanism. 45 The FCSRCA only outlines the
parameters of a much-needed comprehensive government regulation that
tackles the problem of ensuring that ART patients are receiving quality
medical care and forthright information. Further, it leaves the formulation
and implementation of any regulation mirroring the Act solely up to the
individual state legislatures and their pocketbooks. The FCSRCA
"represents governmental regulation at its weakest." 46 "Existing controls
39. 42 U.S.C § 263a-4(b) (2012).
40. Hecht, supra note 9, at 255.
41. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 14, at 844.
42. Lal, supra note 4, at 533.
43. Id. at 534.
44. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 14, at 847.
45. Lal, supra note 4, at 534.
46. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 658.
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are patchwork, and most decisions are left to individual providers and their
patients."4 7
Federal regulation of ART is not only justifiable but also necessary.
As "consumers" of ART technologies, couples are often so desperate for a
biological child that they become too emotionally involved to maintain an
objective stance toward the practices of ART providers.48 All the federal
government has done is issue voluntary guidelines for ART providers
without any enforcement authority. No state department is authorized to
punish a fertility clinic or practitioner for non-compliance with guidelines.
The Act fails to provide noncompliant organizations with even a slap on
the wrist. Consequently, ART providers and intermediaries are free to
perform procedures for profit without government regulation.
B. Industry Self-Regulation
Because government regulation of reproductive medicine is minimal,
ART providers operate under some form of self-regulation.4 9 Providers
utilizing exclusively private money to operate are largely free to develop
their own rules and procedures governing reproductive technology."o
Generally, providers are free to offer new, experimental infertility options,
which are solely limited by the practitioners themselves or their supporting
institutions."
Industry leaders cite professional guidelines that may be helpful in
industry self-regulation.52 Numerous medical societies and associations
have published guidelines for ART providers." The American Society for
Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM"), a leading advocate for increased ART
regulation, has issued a statement on ART and proposed guidelines.54 The
ASRM is the "leading market force in the field of reproductive medicine"
representing individuals in law, bioethics, and reproductive medicine."
The organization reports on clinically relevant issues in reproductive
47. Margaret Foster Riley & Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Reproductive Genetics: A Review ofAmerican
Bioethics Commissions and Comparison to the British Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority, 6
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004).
48. Lal, supra note 4, at 535.
49. Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, supra note 1, at 578.
50. Id. at 587.
51. Id. at 578.
52. Lyerly, supra note 28, at 703.
53. See Revised Minimum Standards for Practices Offering Assisted Reproductive Technologies, AM.
SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED. (2008), available at
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/NewsandPublictions/PracticeGuidelines/Guideline
s andMinimum Standards/Revised minimum standards(l).pdf.
54. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 673.
55. Id
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technology.56 These reports propose industry guidelines and standards;
however, "they fall short of providing adequate oversight for the
protection of participants in innovative procedures."57 Following the
guidelines is purely voluntary, and adherence to them is not required for
professional certification, which itself is voluntary and does not hinder
participation in the market."
The ASRM and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
("SART") created the Reproductive Laboratory Accreditation Program
("RLAP")." The program established standards for accreditation.60
According to SART, two-thirds of SART members are accredited through
RLAP." As an accredited clinic, providers are required to comply with
SART and ASRM guidelines. However, this accreditation is ultimately
meaningless since neither the ASRM nor SART has the ability to enforce
any requirements where even initial participation is voluntary.62
Furthermore, the associations do not have authority to sanction those ART
providers in violation of the guidelines, nor do they have an independent
auditing mechanism to detect such violations.63
SART's website lists its member companies, which include Bayer,
Merck, Wyeth, Lilly, and Brown & Brown, meaning corporate giants are
the entities making policy decisions in this market in the absence of
federal oversight.64 The ART industry's mechanism of self-regulation is
large, wealthy companies controlling the marketplace. The fertility
provider's alignment with the pharmaceutical and biological products
industry may not be unethical or harmful; however, "groups like SART
certainly cannot provide for sufficiently objective review of these clinics
in light of their corporate relations."6
Professional organizations provide the most substantial guidelines for
clinics, but these are either non-pervasive or not legally binding.6 6 There is
interplay of powerful, dominant participants in a market economy with
unyielding demand. Self-regulation is insufficient for ensuring the health
56. Lyerly, supra note 28, at 702.
57. Id.
58. Lyerly, supra note 28, at 702.
59. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 673.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 673-74.
62. Lyerly, supra note 28, at 702.
63. Id. at 675.
64. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 675.
65. Id. at 676.
66. Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, supra note 1, at 578.
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and welfare of ART patients and resulting children."7 The lack of
oversight and regulation incentivizes abuse within the ART industry.
There is minimal accountability, and providers are not shy to exploit the
marketplace and play upon consumer emotions.
V. ABUSES AND CONCERNS
The fertility marketplace operates in stark contrast to most enterprises
within the United States. It "operates without scrutiny from the usual
regulatory oversight of enterprises that affect the health of citizens."68
There has been little effort for federal oversight of the fertility market, and
a general lack of recognition of the need to regulate." This produces the
opportunity for industry actors to continue the unethical practices that have
become characteristic of the ART market.o
ART has spawned an industry that helps thousands of American
couples and women in conceiving and has only increased in popularity."
About 7.1% or 2.1 million married couples are infertile.72 Infertility is a
natural consequence of aging and as individuals choose to bear children
later in life they increasingly turn to fertility treatments as a solution to
infertility." In addition, ART provides a remedy for women seeking to
bear and raise children on their own and same-sex couples desperate for
children.
More than 11,000 physicians provide fertility services to an estimated
172,000 women each year.74 And, while it has become an increasingly
popular medical intervention, ART also has become a flourishing
industry." "Lack of national policy has resulted in the existence of
exploitation and commercialization of one of the most valued and personal
aspects of our society."76 Due to recent advancements in technology and
the availability of ART procedures, the private infertility marketplace has
exploded into a vibrant, free market.77  The exchange of money for
reproductive services brings a commercial element, but it does not change
67. Heled, supra note 26, at 276.
68. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 679.
69. Lal, supra note 4, at 533.
70. Id.
71. Hecht, supra note 9, at 227.
72. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008).
73. Noah, supra note 12, at 612.
74. Hecht, supra note 9, at 230.
75. Noah, supra note 12, at 614.
76. Lal, supra note 4, at 518.
77. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 677.
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the nature of the private and intimate act of reproduction." This free
market has prompted the ART industry to evolve into a moneymaking
machine, incentivizing fraud and abuse to make a profit.
A. Big Business and Market Forces
Over the past few decades, advances in reproductive technology have
created a market for babies "in which parents choose traits, clinics woo
clients, and specialized providers earn millions of dollars a year."79 The
fertility market has turned into interplay between powerful market
participants and the economics of supply and demand." "The dominant
market forces in ART include the fertility clinics, the physicians, the
pharmaceutical companies, the suppliers, the representative organizations,
the embryo laboratories, the gamete middlemen and brokers, and the
infertile consumer."81
It is estimated that today's ART industry reaps annual revenues of
nearly seven billion dollars, and that figure continues to grow as the use of
reproductive technology skyrockets.82 While the majority of the roughly
400 fertility clinics in the United States today operate for profit, some
clinics are free-standing entrepreneurial facilities, and other clinics are
housed within larger health care institutions." Additionally, the
international sperm supply industry is particularly concentrated in the
United States with four of the five largest sperm banks based in the United
States.84 These four banks control about 65% of the international sperm
market, an industry estimated to be worth between $50 million and $100
million dollars.85
"Much like other fee-for-service operations such as elective cosmetic
surgery, hospitals may establish fertility clinics as lucrative profit
centers."86 A single IVF cycle may cost anywhere from $10,000 to
$20,000, and, because couples may have to undergo many cycles in order
to achieve a successful pregnancy, couples invest upwards of $200,000 for
a single pregnancy." There has been no uniform pricing or price
78. Andrews & Elster, supra note 2, at 40.
79. Robertson, supra note 8, at 668.
80. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 676.
81. Id. at 681.
82. Daar, supra note 72, at 25.
83. Noah, supra note 12, at 614.
84. Buck Wolf, Sending Sperm Abroad, ABC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2005), at
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Sex/story?id=93277&page=1.
85. Id.
86. Noah, supra note 12, at 614.
87. Hecht, supra note 9, at 229.
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resolutions proposed to curb the commodification of these procedures."
Furthermore, because profitability is a function of the number of cycles
performed, clinics have an incentive to utilize IVF prematurely before
exploring cheaper, potentially effective options. The high demand for
these innovative fertility treatments coupled with a void in federal
regulation has helped to make reproductive medicine a lucrative business
first and a medical undertaking second.89 The commercial-minded actors
in this business have little interest in proper record keeping and
questioning the safety of medical practices as these exercises may greatly
harm the earning power of their business.90
Exacerbating the issue of lack of oversight is that ART procedures
are rarely covered by insurance." "The result is that any role insurance
might play in encouraging evidence-based practice is minimized in the
context of ARTs."" Although, in 1992, the American Fertility Society and
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists recognized that
infertility is a disease stemming from the abnormal function of the
reproductive system.93 Despite this recognition, there has been a general
lack of willingness to include infertility treatment in health insurance
policies. And, while some states have elected to enact legislation that
requires health insurance companies cover at least a portion of infertility
treatments,94 Congress has not acted to mandate funding of treatment under
health insurance policies.95 Treating infertility like any other disease thus
implicating health care coverage would impact the way fertility treatments
are provided.96 However, "limited insurance coverage contributes to the
tendency for fertility care to operate more as a business than other areas of
medicine, with market forces instead of regulatory oversight shaping the
parameters of practice."97
The absence of insurance coverage in the ART business has a two-
fold effect. First, because health insurers rarely cover the cost of ART,
88. Anetta Pietrzak, The Price of Sperm. An Economic Analysis of the Current Regulations Surrounding
the Gamete Donation Industry, 14 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 121, 131 (2012).
89. Lyerly, supra note 28, at 696.
90. Lyerly, supra note 28, at 697.
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Jessica Hawkins, Separating Fact from Fiction: Mandated Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treat-
ments, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 203, 204 (2007).
94. State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, (Mar. 2012), at
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx.
95. Lal, supra note 4, at 531-32.
96. Lyerly, supra note 28, at 696-97.
97. Id- at 697.
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individuals pay the expenses directly and in full.98 Second, the providers
play off the emotional desperation of these patients for the full, out-of-
pocket payment. They utilize aggressive marketing techniques in hope of
luring desperate and vulnerable patients into their facilities, and "clinics
are not shy about relying on the emotional desperation of childless couples
to inflate asking price."99
Providers are free to operate in a laissez-faire climate.'o The
dominant social value in the United States can be described as "show me
the money."' Providers offer experimental technology and buy and sell
genetic material outside the regulatory system of the United States; "they
operate in the purest model of a free-market enterprise."' 02 The only
oversight is provided by organizations such as ASRM and SART, which,
as mentioned previously, are ruled by dominant industry leaders, which
appear to operate as lobbying groups to keep the status quo of self-
regulation."0 3 These groups can exert a disproportionate influence over the
regulatory process.
The winners in the fertility industry include providers,
pharmaceutical companies, and technological providers. These actors
capitalize on fragmented regulatory structure in order to reap the biggest
monetary benefits out of the consumer-patients, who, because of the nature
of this market, are provided with an imperfect amount of information.'04
The mixture of dominant industry forces and the endless supply and
demand for ART creates an incentive to avoid regulation. While large
lobbying forces hinder government intervention, private clinics and
providers are free to exploit consumers through the market forces in the
ART vacuum.
B. Inflated Success Rates
Infertility is a source of great personal suffering, and can be
especially traumatic and emotional for the spouse who feels he or she is
being replaced because of his or her inability to perform a natural
biological function.' 5 Couples and individuals willingly expend tens, if
98. Noah, supra note 12, at 616.
99. Lal, supra note 4, at 530.
100. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 645.
101. Andrews & Elster, supra note 2, at 45.
102. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 3, at 672.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 679.
105. Andrews & Elster, supra note 2, at 50.
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not hundreds of thousands of dollars in their desperate quest for a child.10 6
ART providers understand and exploit the common consumer belief that
no price is too high to pay for a child. "Certainly the price incentives are
sufficient to make the 'ART baby business' a lucrative one."'o0 This
makes consumers vulnerable to the profit-driven providers that overplay
success and efficacy of their procedures.'
In a deregulated market driven by profit, fraudulently exaggerating
success rates is commonplace, and providers who choose not to "play the
game," cannot meaningfully participate in this competitive industry.
Reporting success rates is purely voluntary; however, there is a market
incentive to not only provide such rates but also exaggerate them in the
absence of regulation.109
In such a large and competitive industry, questions arise about the
accuracy of promotional claims made by fertility clinics, particularly
pregnancy success rates."10 And, although the FCSRCA dictates that
clinics report their success rates, such reports are voluntary and often
fraudulent."' However, without an independent audit, there is no way of
verifying the accuracy of such claims."2  "Methods of reporting
significantly influence the derivation of the actual success rate."'l3
Many fertility clinics have different definitions of IVF successes,
enabling them to manipulate success rates.'14 Some clinics may label
unsuccessful cycles, particularly those with older patients who are likely to
have more difficultly becoming pregnant, as "research" and not count
them in their overall success rates."' Additionally, clinics may inflate
success rates by taking advantage of the lack of definitions. Some clinics
statistically manipulate success rates by reporting the rate of pregnancy
instead of the successful live birth rate."'6
Clinics may try maintaining a higher success rate by turning patients
away."' Clinics with a high number of difficult patients, such as older
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patients and patients with previous IVF failure, will have lower pregnancy
rates."' Clinics may refuse to provide treatment to couples over a certain
age who, because of their age, have decreased chances of IVF success.11 9
Additionally, philosophies and practices of different providers can
significantly affect the program's purported success rates.120 Clinics may
report higher rates because they transfer more embryos, which leads to a
much higher incidence of multiple gestation.121 Multiple gestation may be
very dangerous and pose a health risk to the mother and surviving babies.
In such circumstances, "the risk of premature birth increases dramatically,
resulting in a significant risk to the health and survival of the infants."' 22
In addition to multiple gestation increasing the risk for premature birth,
studies have linked multi-fetal pregnancy with low birth weight and birth
defects.'23 CDC researchers "estimate[d] that more than 3 percent of the
low-birth-weight infants and more than 4 percent of the very-low-birth-
weight infants born in 1997 were conceived with [ART]-six times the
proportions that would be expected on the basis of the frequency of these
procedures."' 2 4
Another practice clinics utilize is liberally cancelling cycles prior to
retrieval when there is a low response to stimulation.125 Moreover, clinics
have monetary and reporting incentives to utilize IVF early in the course
of therapy rather than exploring less expensive and potentially effective
options.126 In doing this, they inflate rates by including patients who
would have gotten pregnant without IVF.127
However, despite their potentially manipulative, unethical, and
unsafe practices, clinics are free to publish such rates. "The variance in
success rates lure hopeful women to the IVF institutions and encourages
extensive financial and emotional investments in programs with
questionable credibility. "128
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C. False Representations
Not only do IVF providers have ample opportunity to defraud
consumer patients, sperm banks have the opportunity as well. "A sperm
bank exemplifies the classic third party intermediary."1 29  Third parties
involved in this moneymaking enterprise seek to gain profits from the
commercialization of procreation.130 For some couples and single women,
obtaining a viable sperm from an outside donor is necessary to carry out
the procedure.13' Sperm banks have been quick to capitalize on the market
demand; sperm banking is a multi-million dollar industry that is
responsible for about 30,000 births each year. 3 2  Yet, despite their
increased use and acceptance, sperm banks have remained "enveloped in
secrecy and lacking comprehensive regulation."l33 Without regulation
imposing lawful duties, sperm banks are free to exploit consumers through
fraudulent misrepresentation without liability.
The 2006 controversy involving five children born with a serious
gene defect highlighted the fraudulent practices in sperm banks. The
children, fathered by a sperm donor, were born with a gene defect that
resulted in a blood disease that greatly increases their risk for leukemia
and requires daily shots of an expensive drug to prevent infections.13
There is a 50% chance that an affected child will pass the disorder onto his
or her offspring.135 Their father, sperm donor no. F827, passed this genetic
disorder onto five of his eleven children conceived through the use of his
sperm deposits to a Michigan sperm bank throughout the 1990s.13 6
Doctors determined it was the sperm donor father who was responsible for
passing on the genetic disorder; however, doctors could not confirm this
because they could not locate donor no. F827 and could not test the
remaining samples without his consent.' Exacerbating the issue was the
fact that the sperm bank that collected donor no. F827's sperm did not
contact other recipients of his sperm to tell them that their children may
have this genetic disorder because they had no legal duty to do so.'
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The 2009 case of Donovan v. Idant Laboratories illustrates the
difficulty in holding a sperm bank liable for misrepresentation when the
legislature imposes no duties on it.139 In Donovan, the district court,
applying New York law, held that claims of strict liability and third-party
beneficiary breach of warranty claims "are properly termed claims of
'wrongful life,"' which New York does not recognize.140 Brittany
Donovan, a mentally disabled child, sought to recover based on theory of
products liability due to a genetic defect inherited from her sperm donor
father, donor G738.14 ' In 1994, Donna Donovan, Brittany's mother,
entered into a contract with Idant to purchase semen for use in artificial
insemination.142 In the contract, Idant made representations about its
product, the semen, including a claim that the donor went through an
extensive and thorough screening process to ensure he had no genetic
abnormalities. 14 3 The semen was subsequently used in Ms. Donovan's
artificial insemination and Brittany was born in 1996.14
After her pediatrician noticed developmental abnormalities, Brittany
underwent testing and was diagnosed as a Fragile X carrier. 145  After
confirming that she did not carry the disease, Ms. Donovan filed a
complaint, on Brittany's behalf, against Idant alleging "negligence, breach
of contract, third-party beneficiary breach of contract, breach of the
express warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, negligent misrepresentation, strict products liability and
negligent infliction of emotional distress" due to G738's "defective
sperm."l4 6
The court found that Ms. Donovan's claims were time-barred given
the relevant statute of limitations.147 However, Brittany's claims of
negligence and negligent misrepresentation were not time-barred. Despite
this, the court found that these causes of action constituted claims for
wrongful life, which New York does not recognize, and dismissed both for
failure to state a claim.148
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Donovan highlights the present impossibility of holding sperm banks
liable under nearly any cause of action due to lack of regulation. Though
the decision opens up the possibility of treating these cases as products
liability issues, the decision fundamentally fails to recognize a duty on the
part of sperm banks to substantively ascertain the accuracy of
representative claims and screen donors in the first place. While the
court's decision was the right one given that it cannot make up a legal
fantasy (i.e. duty) not in place to hold the sperm bank liable, Donovan-a
Michigan case-and others cases like it, should prompt state legislatures to
finally address the fraudulent practices rampant in sperm banks.
Despite recipients receiving the wrong sperm, contracting HIV 49 and
children inheriting genetic diseases from ill-screened and misrepresented
anonymous donors, the use of donor sperm from sperm banks continues to
be a popular practice.' The government must address these issues in
order to protect desperate consumer-patients from the abuses carried out
by lazy or exploitive sperm banks. "Increased regulation is needed to
reduce the repeated and much-publicized abuse in sperm banks."'5 '
Without regulation and minimal recordkeeping, sperm banks are free to
misappropriate vital information, in particular, donor characteristics.'5 2
Sperm bank liability is almost non-existent and donors are anonymous and
surrounded by confidentiality provisions and contracts that make
truthfulness and accountability unrealistic in the current regulatory
regime.' Because of this policy of secrecy and anonymity, few sperm
banks maintain donor records and many even destroy donor records once
the supply has been depleted.'54 "The wall of confidentiality and privacy,
which has a solid justification, also screens the entire assisted reproductive
process."' 5 Due to the lack of regulation, no duty of care is imposed upon
sperm banks; thus, sperm banks are free to perpetuate the exploitation
rampant in the ART industry.'
There is no limit to donor compensation in the United States. When
individual patients select a donor who would not otherwise be available,
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compensation is practically unlimited.' However, typically a sperm
donor receives an average of thirty-four to forty-four dollars in
compensation per visit directly from the sperm bank." 8 In turn, sperm
banks significantly mark up the cost and sell the sperm vial to fertility
clinics for about $275-$400 per vial.' Further, sperm banks face no
shortage of willing donors because donating sperm is relatively
straightforward and quick.6 o Additionally, men do not need to undergo
painful hormone injections unlike their female counterparts."'
Because of the large profit margin within the sperm bank industry,
these intermediaries face stiff competition with one another to sell their
"superior" sperm. Competing sperm banks use puffery to attract business.
And, while puffery tends to be a given in commercial enterprises, sperm
banks distort the line between advertisement and medical guarantee. With
the lack of regulation, sperm banks are free to misappropriate donor
characteristics in order to claim a more attractive donor pool.16 2 Typically,
sperm banks fraudulently exaggerate or misrepresent donor characteristics
such as height, hair color, disposition, and education. In this competitive
industry, one must wonder whether "Mr. Perfect" truly exists.'
Further, many sperm banks deem it unnecessary to test "quality"
individuals such as medical students.'64 To them, a cursory glance for
intelligence and good looks is a sufficient screening mechanism."' "For
the first record artificial insemination by donor, in 1984, a physician
impregnated a patient with 'fresh semen from the best-looking member of
the class."" 66 It is thoughtless to assume that a superficial selection of the
most well-educated and good-looking donors necessarily means the safest
donors. Until physicians in the sperm banks realize that the "best" donor
does not automatically mean the best looking, but rather the most
thoroughly tested, patients cannot be assured they are receiving the proper
care.
Not only do sperm banks misappropriate information because of a
lack of reporting requirements and a veil of secrecy, they also opt out of
donor screening and testing procedures, which saves about $800-$900 per
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screening.'67 Donor screening amounts to nothing more than a superficial,
cursory glance. A study conducted at the University of North Carolina
found that the majority of sperm donors tested do not recognize a genetic
problem in their family history, and sperm banks refusing to perform
genetic testing makes it impossible to determine whether these males are
carriers of serious genetic disorders.168 "It is often easier to learn whether
a perspective donor plays the cello than whether he has a family history of
Huntington's Disease."l69 And, while associations such as ASRM and
SART urge sperm banks to properly screen donors, they amount to
nothing more than suggestions." 0
VI. HOW TO BEGIN REGULATING
Regulation reform of assisted reproductive technology is the only
viable solution to the appalling abuses committed by providers and
intermediaries that are allowed to occur within the current system."'
Dwelling on whether society has proceeded too quickly in accepting
technological control over conception is not productive.'72 When initially
suspect technology is established as an ordinary part of modern culture,
regulators must be quick to alleviate concerns associated with the new
technologies."' However, they must also be cautious of over-deterring or
stifling new research.'74 Regulators must alleviate public concern while
being careful to avoid a lost opportunity; therefore, regulators must be
wary of aligning regulations so closely with public opinion. "The problem
of premature entrenchment of a new technology might be lessened by
tailoring regulation to minimize the most difficult ethical problems.""'
A. Balancing Act
Although ART originated as a means to overcome infertility and
provide the ultimate joy of parenthood to thousands of individuals and
families throughout the United States, the fundamental failure of the
government to enact sufficient regulatory barriers and guidelines has led to
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medical irresponsibility where providers are rewarded not by providing the
best patient-centered care but by aggressive marketing tactics and
fraudulent behavior.
Regulatory reform is not an easy feat, and there is no perfect
regulatory structure. Guidelines and laws affecting the right to family and
privacy are challenging and controversial; however, in this context they
are undoubtedly necessary. A regulatory structure must balance the right
to familial autonomy and privacy with the need to assure patients are
receiving safe medical care.
To some, fertility treatments constitute unethical medical
experimentation on human beings in direct contrast to how countless
infertile couples feel, which makes politicians apprehensive to confront
this lightening rod issue via regulation. Governmental agencies in the
fertility industry have received very little help from Congress on how to
regulate.'76 Therefore, regulatory agencies, such as the CDC and DHHS,
"are free to develop close and collaborative relationships with the market
stakeholders.""' This has led to a series of inadequate compromises, such
as industry self-regulation."' The question of how to regulate assisted
reproductive technology has mirrored the abortion debate.' The initially
strong connection between abortion and reproductive services created an
early regulatory deadlock that unexpectedly accelerated the development
and broad availability of ART.'
In order to achieve reform, the government must address the market-
driven nature of the fertility market, which provides economic incentives
for providers to skirt ethical standards and put profits before public
health.'"' There are industry giants strongly tied to the interests of the
market who work to prevent legislation to continue exploiting consumer-
patients. The market forces undermine any opportunity to assess the
current state of deregulation. These successful attempts to stop legislation
are harmful to the integrity of the medical industry, and they are deadly to
patients. The initial public acceptance and use of this technology coupled
with the imbedded market forces in the industry are the roadblocks to
substantive regulation.
Successful regulation will be a balancing act. It will account for
entrenched market-forces and religious considerations. It will be
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comprehensive and thoughtful but not burdensome. Reform should place
a premium on patient safety and health with all other considerations
secondary. Legislatures should not stifle the voices of interest groups and
religious branches; however, it should be careful not to consider
prospective regulation as a fully economic or a fully religious issue. This
is a medical and ethical issue. Scientific progress and innovation hinge on
the government's ability to successfully implement ART policy. The
legislature must stop promulgating empty regulation; it must place itself in
the center of the regulation ART demands.
B. Federal Regulatory Framework-The Rebirth of the FCSRCA
I am not proposing that a regulatory framework be created from
scratch. My proposals are based off the 1992 FCSRCA. The FCSRCA
provides an excellent starting point for comprehensive regulation.
The Act requires the HHS to delegate to the CDC a model program
for the certification of ART laboratories to be adopted and carried out
voluntarily by individual states. 18 2
This certification program should be extended to all fertility
providers, including IVF clinics and sperm banks and based off of an
adopted code of medical ethics. In addition, the CDC should make
adoption of the certification program a federal program mandating that
states abide by the certification program by a specific date. The federal
government should incentivize states to speed up their compliance by
offering incentive payments to eligible professionals and providers who
adopt, implement, and demonstrate meaningful compliance with the
certification program and the adopted code of medical ethics. This ensures
patients are receiving uniform and proper care throughout the United
States. Further, it would be easier for the federal government to regulate
one policy that reaches across all states rather than leave it up to each
individual state to adopt patchwork standards.
Such certification would not impede clinics' and sperm banks'
abilities to participate in the market; it merely weeds out the clinics that
are committing egregiously unethical practices such as not reporting and
collecting data regarding clinical practices and outcomes, not properly
screening sperm donors, and implementing dangerous practices such as
multiple gestation. The CDC should publicize the clinics and sperm banks
that are properly certified, and uncertified providers should be banned
from the market with monetary sanctions.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(a)(2) (2006).
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Sanctions must be adopted with the appropriate corresponding
enforcement mechanism. Such sanctions should include the ability to
revoke a clinic certification. Further, the act should make practicing
without the proper certification a criminal offense. Sanctions should
impose a variety of charges, fines, and prison terms where appropriate.
Further, by making proper reporting and data collection mandatory
under the certification program, the government will be able to not only
ensure compliance with regulatory standards but also will be provided
with needed information. The data may be synthesized to identify health
implications of various practices and procedures in order to help the
government ensure the mandatory standards are appropriate and highlight
areas that may need more regulatory. It can be used to show areas that
may need expanded requirements and also give providers and patients
more information on long-term health outcomes for them and their
children.
Certification should be extended to the providers in ART facilities as
well. A licensing board should (1) properly license providers, (2) require
that the facility reports a sufficient level of background information for all
employees and staff, and (3) continually monitor staff and staff activities
and practices.
In addition, medical definitions must be uniformly defined and
adopted. Clinics should not be able to manipulate medical terminology
and phrases, such as "pregnancy success rate." Definitions must be clear
and strict.
However, no regulation would be effective without an enforcement
mechanism. It is paramount that the government recognizes the need for
this legislation and devotes resources to the program. Ingenuously
budgeting $1 million a year to such an immense undertaking is wholly
inadequate, and history has proved this. The DHHS and CDC must
allocate sufficient federal funding for the proper oversight of providers and
the collection of information from providers by a government-run
oversight body, not the providers themselves. Therefore, the budget must
account for extensive and annual audits of these ART providers.
In addition, going further than the FCSRCA, the DHHS should
require each patient, prior to undergoing any procedure, to partake in a
consultation with the provider where they thoroughly go over the proposed
procedure and alternatives. Additionally, the provider must be required to
review the relevant statistics reports compiled by the licensing committee
and notify patients of counseling options while they undergo the ART
process.
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Further, the DHHS would be wise to implement a center where
consumer-patients focus their complaints, concerns, and ask questions.
This would not only help guide patients through the process, but also, it
may help the DHHS to identify potentially noncompliant facilities and
providers.
This reform must be undertaken with the cooperation of numerous
groups with the proper knowledge and know-how. Consumer groups and
medical professions with the appropriate expertise should be the leading
consultants of ART legislation. The government should expend money
and resources to formulate a board and focus groups under the direction of
the CDC to identify problems in the industry and devise solutions targeted
at those issues that can be realistically and successfully implemented. The
leading consultants should be from the ASRM, practicing ART physicians
and providers, scientists, and business advisors. The ART world is
currently veiled in secrecy with wealthy, educated patients simply not
knowing the right questions to ask. Therefore, medical professionals
driving this regulation will be a preemptive shield from fraud and abuse
within the market where providers seize the opportunity to take advantage
of patient emotions and pocketbooks.
VII. CONCLUSION
The evolution and use of assisted reproductive technology has raised
serious questions and implications for this generation and those to come.
Assisted reproductive technology has advanced and flourished in the
unregulated market in which it operates. It is responsible for the births of
thousands of children and has brought joy to many families. However, in
the process of giving the joy of a child, clinics and providers have played
upon patients blinded by emotion and exploited their willingness to
achieve pregnancy at any cost. The great potential for abuse within the
market must be curbed by comprehensive and centralized legislation.
Great abuses cannot continue simply because legislatures struggle with
redefining family in the 21st century. Congress must create a national
policy that forces it to think critically about the social implications of such
technology, which already is entrenched deeply in our nation. Only then,
after a mandated code of ethics and enforceable regulatory structure have
been adopted, can American families utilizing assisted reproductive
technology be confident that their health care is being delivered in the
safest and most cost-effective way.
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